Abstract This study develops a household enterprise model extended to encompass recent advances in collective theory. We use a simulation model in which production and consumption-leisure choices are represented along with the rule governing intra-household resource allocation, to analyze the income and wage responses of each family member. The household is treated as an equilibrium model whose accounts are based on a collective household accounting matrix, with the social dimension being the wife/husband classes. The simulation analysis illustrates the policy relevance of the collective approach to household behavior for inferring the impact of economic policies on individual behavior and welfare. We also propose insightful comparisons with the unitary model to make the behavioral and welfare policy relevance of the collective approach evident.
Economic theory studies the household enterprise as a miniature economy in which intra-household exchanges do not always function properly. Decisions are often taken with imperfect information and family members may frequently act strategically because coordination costs are relatively low. In developing countries such inefficiency sources, internal to the household, are magnified by a generally low degree of competition in land, credit, insurance, and labor markets because factor markets are often thin, in their infancy, or highly segmented.
In developing countries a large portion of families earn some of their livelihood by investing part of the household labor endowment in their own enterprises (Bardhan and Udry 1999) . Such a link between the economics of the firm/farm and the economics of the household is central to development economics and adds to the challenges facing the analysis of behavior at the V C The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com individual rather than the household level. When the family business is in agriculture, then the household enterprise model specializes in a farmhousehold model that has firm roots in the agricultural and development economics literature (Nakajima 1969; Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1985; Chayanov 1986; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; Lambert and Magnac 1998; Taylor and Adelman 2003; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006; Henning and Henningsen 2007) .
Despite the recent theoretical and empirical progress in family economics (Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss 2014) , the decision behavior of the household enterprise is generally studied under the assumption that the basic decision unit is the family in which each individual has the same preferences and weight (Carter and Yao 2002; Taylor and Adelman 2003; Chavas, Petrie, and Roth 2005; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006; Henning and Henningsen 2007; Le 2010; Chang, Huang, and Chen 2012) . Unlike this, the collective approach (Apps and Rees 1988, 1997; Chiappori 1988 Chiappori , 1992 Chiappori , and 1997 considers family members-not the household as a whole-as core decision-makers.
Neoclassical consumption theory is well-suited to explain the rational behavior of single agents rather than the behavior of a small group of persons living together, where the actions of one member can influence the behavior and well-being of the others. Using the unitary model to understand individual choices thus suffers from a number of relevant drawbacks. Most empirical research rejects the conditions underlying the unitary household model (Browning and Chiappori 1998; Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990 ). In the context of unitary models only the well-being of the family as a whole can be recovered by observed market behavior, while policy analysis is concerned with the well-being of individuals, which is the object of interest of collective models. Our measurement effort shares the views advocated by Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010) and O'Donnell et al. (2014) ; both sets of authors suggest evaluating income together with the consumption of market and non-market goods in order to appropriately measure material welfare and exhort governments to measure well-being and make it a policy goal.
This study fills a gap in the theory by extending the household enterprise model to the collective theory (Apps and Rees 1988, 1997; Chiappori 1988 Chiappori , 1992 Chiappori , and 1997 following the initial work on farm-households by Caiumi and Perali (1997) . Our framework considers production, consumption, and labor participation decisions simultaneously in an equilibrium model. The model also has the unique feature of describing the family as taking part in two production activities: a marketable production, which may be an agricultural or a commercial business, and non-marketable domestic production such as housework, caring for household members, or food preparation. The model includes both marketable and non-marketable production, that is, individuals can invest their time in on-farm, domestic activities, and may decide not to work in the off-farm labor market. In the farm-household literature, the option of engaging in domestic non-marketable activities, which is particularly crucial for understanding female labor decisions, has not been considered before. Unlike Chiappori (1997) and Apps and Rees (1997) , who modeled labor supply of working couples, we describe the labor participation of couples where one or both members may decide not to engage in the labor market. Further, while Chiappori (1997) contemplates only the case of marketable production and Apps and Rees (1997) only treat the case of Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy non-marketable production, we account for both marketable and nonmarketable household technologies.
Another novel aspect of our paper is that we construct the household model starting from a collective household accounting matrix, analogous to a social accounting matrix, where, thanks to the collective approach, the social classes within the family can be differentiated by gender or generations (adults/children). Interestingly, the programming model that performs the simulation analysis is the exact replica of the collective empirical model estimated in Menon and Perali (2013) . The functional forms and the associated parameters of the programming model are the same as the econometric model. The analysis is based on a nationwide survey of Italian farm-households undertaken in 1995 by the Italian Institute for Agricultural Markets (ISMEA).
Our collective household enterprise model simulates the impacts of external economic conditions and government policies on individual decisions and welfare levels. We also accommodate failures in the labor market (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; L€ ofgren and Robinson 1997, 1999; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006) as a consequence of market changes. Simulation findings suggest that even small percentage changes in household non-labor income, individual market wages, or output prices are likely to induce policy-relevant reallocation of income and other resources, such as time.
The paper mainly focuses on the collective household enterprise model. For illustrative purposes, the theoretical findings of the collective model are compared with those derived as if the model were represented by a unitary household. The next section shows the collective household enterprise model, followed by a section that derives individual welfare changes in a collective setting. In the following section, we describe the Italian farm-household data used to construct the household social accounting matrix specific to each farm-household type. We also present the household equilibrium programming model and the technique employed for calibration. Subsequently, we comment on results from the simulation analysis of exogenous market changes. The last section summarizes the main findings and suggests some lines for future research.
A Collective Household Enterprise Model
The household enterprise model shows the family as a miniature economy, where the household reproduces the economic characteristics of a macro society at the micro level (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1985; Chayanov 1986; de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; Benjamin 1992; Caiumi and Perali 1997, 2015) .
1 As a production unit, the family purchases inputs from the market and provides inputs such as family labor to produce goods that can be partly sold in the market and partly consumed by its members. As a consumption unit, the family chooses its optimal consumption-leisure bundle given individual time and household budget constraints.
When the household enterprise operates in flexible and competitive markets it faces exogenous buying and selling prices for all productionconsumption goods and labor. In this case, production and consumptionleisure decisions of the household are recursive and therefore separable.
The household enterprise maximizes profits as a producer and then allocates family income, which also includes profits, so as to maximize utility as a consumer. In a non-separable household model, market prices differ from the individual-specific shadow prices within the household and productionconsumption decisions must be jointly modeled. According to L€ ofgren and Robinson (1999) , separability fails to hold ". . . whenever the household shadow price of at least one production-consumption good is not given exogenously by the market but instead is determined endogenously by the interaction between household demand and supply."
In the following sub-sections we set the notation for individual preferences and production technologies, and then formalize the household enterprise model within a collective decision program. To keep matters simple and to facilitate comparisons with the traditional household enterprise model, we start with a separable model. Market failures are then accounted for in the simulation section.
Preferences
In our context, the household comprises two adult persons denoted by i ¼ 1, 2 that take part in production and consumption activities.
2 Each individual has rational preferences over the private consumption of a composite market good c i , leisure l i , and the domestically produced good z i :
3 Individual preferences are characterized by a strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave utility function
, where d i is a set of individualspecific observable characteristics affecting preferences directly. All members of the family allocate their total endowment of time T i to a marketable production activity, h i , and a non-marketable production activity, t i : Family members enjoy leisure, l i , and may work in the off-farm labor market, L i : Thus, each household member faces the following time constraint
Production Technologies
In our model, the household enterprise is specialized in the production of two goods, a marketable product q and a non-marketable good z. The marketable production technology is represented by a strictly increasing and concave function q ¼ f h 1 ; h 2 ; x q ; d q À Á ; where h 1 and h 2 are family members' working hours given a fixed stock of family labor H ¼ h 1 þ h 2 , x q are market inputs also including hired labor, and d q is a set of demographic factors affecting household productivity. We assume that the output q is entirely sold in a competitive market at a constant price p q ; and therefore the family is taken to be a "pure" seller.
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The non-marketable production technology is represented by a strictly increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one function z ¼ g t 1 ; t 2 ; x z ; d z À Á
; where t 1 and t 2 are family domestic labor, x z are bought-in market inputs, and d z is a set of demographic factors affecting domestic productivity. Note that the vector of socio-demographic factors d q and d z affecting productivity may not be the same across production technologies. Further, the specification of marketable and non-marketable production technologies does not admit joint-production between the marketable and non-marketable productions. Unlike the farm product, output z is non-tradable and entirely consumed by the family z ¼ z 1 þ z 2 , and its price is endogenous and household-specific. In addition, the production level of z is in general unobservable by researchers.
In the model we assume that the non-marketable production technology exhibits constant returns to scale. An implication of this assumption is that household decisions regarding production, such as the choice of production activities and levels, and the use of inputs, are not affected by the characteristics of the consumption unit, such as preferences and consumption-side variables like non-labor income or prices of consumption goods (Pollak and Wachter 1975) . This property ensures that the non-marketable production decision can be taken separately from consumption as if the household were operating in perfectly competitive conditions.
The Decision Program
The household enterprise program is modeled using the collective approach (Chiappori 1988 (Chiappori , 1992 . Within this framework, the decision process develops in two stages. In the first stage, acting as a producer, the household makes efficient production choices. In the second stage, household members agree on a rule to allocate family resources and each member freely decides the optimal allocation of her own income among consumption-leisure goods. Notice that under the assumption of separability, both marketable and non-marketable household production decisions derived within alternative household approaches do not differ, while consumption-leisure choices in general are model-specific. This implies that the structural demand functions obtained by solving either the collective or the unitary model are not the same. As illustrated in appendix B, in the context of unitary models the bargaining power between spouses is not taken into account when describing household outcomes. This is not simply a loss in behavioral terms but, because the intra-household resource allocation is ignored, it is impossible to recover individual preferences and to derive individual welfare functions. As a consequence, the unitary representation of the household loses its relevance for those policy makers interested in designing welfare policies targeted to the most vulnerable members of the family, usually children and women.
Marketable Household Production
The marketable production setup has a short-run perspective. On-farm family labor is treated as a quasi-fixed factor allocatable both across activities, when information is available, and between spouses, as in our case.
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This specification avoids considering family and hired labor as homogenous (D'Antoni, Mishra, and Gillespie 2011) and the measurement error associated with treating a quasi-fixed input as variable by associating a market price in lieu of the appropriate shadow value (Mishra, Moss, and Erickson 2004; Menon, Perali, and Rosati 2005) . Variable hired labor is paid at the observed market wage, while labor offered by the family members is assigned its shadow value.
Households choose the optimal amount of variable inputs by minimizing the variable costs of producing q conditional on a fixed stock of family labor H and market price for variable inputs r,
We assume that both family members supply some positive hours in the family enterprise. We make the additional assumption that the husband, indexed as i ¼ 1, supplies the family business a minimum number of hours, H 1 , necessary to keep the enterprise operative. This assumption would reflect the traditional division of labor within the couple, where husbands are more likely to run the farm activity, while wives engage both in domestic and enterprise tasks. The optimal conditional demand of bought-in market input isx q ¼ x; r; H; d q À Á ; and by the maximization of the profit function max q p ¼ pÀ VC q; r; H; d q À Á , we derive the optimal supply functioñ q ¼ q p q ; r; H; d q À Á : By the envelope theorem, from equation (1) the shadow wage of on-farm labor supply is derived as (Schankerman and Nadiri 1986; Paris 1989) 
The shadow wage w Ã on depends on the output's and inputs' prices, 6 other than the level of quasi-fixed factors and observable heterogeneity, implying that the household model is separable in H, though not in h i ; which is determined endogenously. Because we do not observe who does what in the farm the shadow wage is necessarily the same for both household members. 
Non-marketable Domestic Production
For the non-marketable production, the household minimizes total costs given the production technology min t 1 ;t 2
The first-order necessary conditions (FONCs) are w i À dg t i ¼ 0; for i ¼ 1, 2, where d is the Lagrange multiplier of the technology constraint in program (3). Given the level of z, the optimal amount of time spent by spouses in domestic 6 The shadow wage is calculated at optimal values of the output supply function. 7 The UNECE Manual (2007) argues that "shadow wages from agricultural activities can be estimated on an individual basis if data are collected about who does what in the farm." In addition, according to the shadow wage approach the family "unpaid" labor can be evaluated as the marginal product of labor, corresponding to the subjective evaluation of the disutility associated with an extra hour of work. This approach requires the estimation of a production or a cost function in order to obtain an estimate of the marginal productivity. 8 Without a loss of generality, we assume that the domestic production technology depends only on spouses' time inputs.
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy chores t i is determined only by the individual marginal product of labor and production technology. The FONCs yield the optimal input demandst i ¼ t
1
, is based on the comparison between his leisure price w Ã 1 and the on-farm wage w Ã on as defined in equation (2). Thus, equation (7) becomes
If the husband's endogenous leisure price w Whether an individual participates or not in the off-farm labor market depends on comparisons between her market wage w i and the endogenous leisure price w Ã i . Thus, the Khun-Tucker conditions of equation (9) can be rewritten as
for i ¼ 1; 2: If w Ã i is greater than the market wage w i , then the individual will not be willing to participate in the off-farm labor market. If w Ã i equals her Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy market wage, then the individual may be willing to supply some positive hours in paid work. While in the former case, the model loses the separability property between domestic production and consumption decisions, in the latter case the separability property still holds. Even in the absence of conditions ensuring separability, the decision program of the household enterprise can be decentralized using shadow prices (Jacoby 1993; Skoufias 1994; Apps and Rees 1997; Henning and Henningsen 2007; Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss 2014) .
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Comparative Statics
We now derive individual behavioral responses to exogenous changes in household non-labor income, y, individual market wages, w i , and output price, p q ; in an efficient economy with perfect markets. The comparative statics is compared with that derived by the unitary representation of the farm-household model. The main difference between the two models is that in the collective model changes of prices and income work through the rule governing the distribution of financial resources within the family. This implies that market perturbations operate on optimal outcomes directly, and in addition they modify the intra-household allocation of family resources altering, in turn, the family equilibrium. Formal derivation of the comparative statics for the unitary model is shown in appendix B.
The comparative statics analysis of the model relies on the following set of assumptions based on the empirical results in Menon and Perali (2013) : (i) spouses are gross substitutes in domestic tasks; (ii) leisure and the domesticproduced good are gross substitutes; and (iii) the individual sharing rule is increasing in own market wage rate, non-labor income, and profits, while decreasing in a partner's market wage rate.
Comparative statics results can be summarized in the following set of propositions, and formal proofs are shown in appendix A. The first proposition considers a positive change in household non-labor income y due, for instance, to a direct income payment that the household receives from the government. Proposition 1. (Non-labor Income Effect) Under assumption (iii), members of a household enterprise receiving a direct income transfer increase their consumption demands (including leisure), do not vary their on-farm and domestic labor supply, and reduce their market working hours.
The result of Proposition 1 states that the increase in household non-labor income has only an income effect on individuals' consumption demands and market labor supply through the sharing rule. Table B1 shows that in the collective model the non-labor income effect operates through the sharing rule ou i oy , while in the unitary model a direct impact is produced by changes in non-labor income on leisure-consumption demands and labor supplies.
10 Note that when production decisions are separable from consumption decisions from the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, the solutions to problems (1), (3), and (6) obtained recursively are equal to the optimal solution obtained solving the centralized household enterprise problem simultaneously. When solving the household enterprise problem simultaneously, w Let us now derive individual i's response to an increase in the market wage rate determined, for example, by a rise in a sectoral minimum wage established by law or collective agreements.
Proposition 2. (Own-wage effect) Under assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii), a ceteris paribus increase in individual i's market wage leaves her on-farm labor supply unchanged, while it reduces her domestic working hours. The effects on i's off-farm hours and leisure are ambiguous.
Comparing the corresponding analytical expressions in appendices A and B, the unitary and collective models show similarities and differences in terms of own-wage effects. The two models have in common the direct effect on the individual demand and the effect on the domestic price. Specific to the collective model is the effect on the sharing rule. However, because of the impact on the domestic price, the sign of this effect is also ambiguous in the unitary model. Proposition 3. (Cross-wage Effect) Under assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii), a ceteris paribus increase in individual j's market wage increases i's domestic hours, while on-farm working hours remain unchanged. The impact on i's demand for leisure and off-farm labor market participation is ambiguous.
The comparison of the cross-wage effects between the two models is also interesting. In the case of demand equations derived from a collective model, a change of j's wage has an effect on i's demand equation both through the sharing rule and the endogenous domestic price. In the unitary setting, however, a direct effect is derived together with the effect on the domestic price.
Proposition 4. (Output Price Effect). Under assumptions (i) and (iii)
, a ceteris paribus increase in the output price increases i's demand for leisure and leaves i's domestic hours unchanged. The rise in output price increases male on-farm working hours while decreasing female on-farm labor supply. The impact on paid work is positive for man and ambiguous for woman.
The output price effect does not present remarkable changes between the two models. The difference is in the fact that in the unitary model a change in p q changes the household full income while in the collective model a change in the output price affects the allocation of resources to member i and the associated level of well-being.
The difficulty of unambiguously signing the comparative statics effects is more complicated in a collective framework because the sign of the partial derivatives of the sharing rule are unknown a priori. We now turn to the empirical simulation performed within a household equilibrium framework, where we analyze the behavioral content of Propositions 1-4.
Evaluating Individual Welfare Changes
The micro-simulation analysis is enriched by measurements of individual welfare changes due to exogenous market perturbations that vary market wages. In a household's labor supply model, the compensating variation (CV) can be separated into price (of leisure) and income effects (Creedy and Kalb 2005) . As individual market wages change, individual incomes also vary because of the change in the value of the individual time endowment.
Evaluating welfare variations in a collective setting is especially interesting because a change in market price may affect the well-being of family members differently due to possible adjustments of the rule governing intra-household Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy resource allocation. In a collective model accounting for marketable and nonmarketable productions, additional effects arise.
11 For instance, a change in individual i's market wage alters both the implicit price of the non-marketable good and the sharing rule. As a result, the welfare level of member j is also affected by i's market wage change.
Consider a change in member i's market wage from level w 
where I i is i's full income ensuring the pre-change utility level U i . The first term on the right-hand side of equation (13) measures the price (of leisure) effect, whereas the second term measures the income effect. Note that we calculate the individual compensating variation CV i as the minimum amount of money to be paid to each household member to ensure that each of them is actually compensated for the price change.
An increase in individual market wage increases both the price of leisure and the price of the domestically produced good, so that the welfare change from the price effect is positive. The market wage increase also raises the value of the individual marginal product of labor and full income, so that the welfare change from the income effect is negative. Therefore, the overall effect may be positive or negative. A positive (negative) value of the CV i means that the evaluated market change makes an individual worse (better) off.
Data and the Household Social Accounting Matrix
Data
The empirical analysis is carried out using a nationwide survey on socioeconomic characteristics of Italian rural households undertaken in 1995 by the Italian Institute for Agricultural Markets (ISMEA). The farm-household survey combines information about household and farm characteristics, farm production and profits, stylized time use, off-farm money income, governmental and intra-household transfers, consumption, and information about the degree of autonomy in decision making by household members. It is worth noting that, even though the ISMEA survey was carried out in 1995, the survey meets the principles and recommendations regarding methodology and data systems on rural development and agricultural household income suggested by the United Nations Economic Commission in the Handbook on Rural Households ' Livelihood and Well-Being (2007) . A further feature of the ISMEA survey is that it records information about the consumption of exclusive goods, such as clothing for women and men.
This information is sufficient to identify the rule governing the intra-household allocation of resources (Chiappori and Ekeland 2009) .
For illustrative convenience, the empirical simulation is carried out for two farm-household types of interest: the non-professional, which is the average of the medium and small size farm households, and the professional, comprising large and very large farm households. 13 The distinction between professional and non-professional farm households is of special relevance from a policy perspective. In general, professional farms are the elective recipients of agricultural and rural development policies, whereas non-professional farm households are the subject of interest of welfare policies. In principle, the distinction between farm-household types can be useful to gauge the differential effects of coupling agricultural with welfare policies.
Descriptive statistics of professional and non-professional farms are shown in table 1. Professional and non-professional farmers present some common features but also some peculiarities. Both families are, on average, in the middle of their life-cycle. Professional farm households are equally distributed in the north and south of Italy but are relatively less frequent in central Italy. Non-professional farms are mainly located in southern Italy (49%). Most professional farm households are located in plain areas. On average, professional farm households are twice as large as non-professional farm households, and the value of their land and capital endowments are significantly greater. By comparing the demand for inputs expressed in shares, professional farm households are much more capital-intensive relative to non-professional farms that are much more family-labor intensive. As for production choices, professional farms are more farming-oriented, whereas non-professional farms mainly produce horticulture products or run small vineyards. Figures on individual labor marginal productivity are similar for different types of farm. It is not surprising that marginal labor productivity is greater for men than for women. Members of professional farms generate a larger full income and tend to spend their incomes on market goods, whereas members of non-professional farms mainly consume the domestically-produced good and leisure time. An important distinguishing feature of non-professionals is that their members provide a positive amount of hours in the off-farm labor market. On the contrary, agricultural activity is the only source of income for professional farms.
The time budget gives us a picture of the typical weekday of a farmer. An individual normally spends 10 hours per day on activities such as rest, personal care, and eating, then 14 hours per day are left to working activities and leisure enjoyment. Whatever the farm type, men spend, on average, between 9 and 10 hours in working activities. Professional farms' men spend 8 hours in on-farm activities against 5 hours of non-professional farms' men. The latter work, on average, 90 minutes in the off-farm labor market. Irrespective of the farm-type, men spend less than 3 hours per day in domestic chores. On the other hand, in both types of farm, women spend longer hours in domestic work and less time in agricultural activities. Women of non-professional farms supply, on average, about 90 minutes in paid employment.
Collective Household Accounting Matrix
Accounting matrices of micro economies such as farm-household economies or household enterprises are a common policy tool used to describe the flows of all economic transactions and transfers taking place between the household and the rest of the economy. We contribute to the literature by building a Collective Household Accounting Matrix (CHAM) that also describes the flows of financial transfers taking place within the household. The CHAM shows the interdependency of production activities, consumption demands, labor participation choices, income formation, and income redistribution across household members or classes such as male and female gender classes. Notice that only in a collective setting it is possible to derive an accounting matrix at the household level describing the intra-household redistribution of resources because the collective approach allows the identification of the intra-household transfers between family members. We build the CHAM for both professional and non-professional farms (tables C1 and C2, respectively). The computation of CHAM row and column entries is explained in appendix C.
Calibration Technique
The programming model is the exact replica of the collective empirical model estimated in Menon and Perali (2013) . The functional forms and associated parameters of the programming model are the same as the econometric model. In particular, as shown in appendix D, we adopt a Translog specification for the cost function associated with both marketable and nonmarketable production, as well as a linear AIDS specification for individual preferences.
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Simulation Results of the Programming Model
The collective household enterprise model is programmed as an equilibrium model to describe the behavioral responses of the production, consumption-leisure, and off-farm labor choices to economic and social policies, and to evaluate their impact on individual welfare levels. The model can be used to perform simulations and policy experiments and to predict the impact of changes in exogenous variables or parameters on production activities, individual consumption, and labor supply decisions.
We examine individual responses to a 10% increase in non-labor income, the wife's wage, and output prices in sequence (tables 3, 4, and 5 respectively). The simulation results are compared with the benchmark case described in table 2.
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The simulation results comply with the qualitative prediction of Proposition 1. When all markets are perfect, production and consumption are separable so that a non-labor income increase does not affect production. This is the case for marketable production irrespective of the farmhousehold types (see panel D of table 3). Still, an increase in non-labor income creates a positive effect on individual full income (see panel B of table D3).
For both farm households, the increase in non-labor income leads to an increase in the individual's full income, which in turn produces positive changes in the individual consumption of all goods (panel C of table 3); it also increases the leisure price of both spouses of the professional farm only.
14 Estimated parameters used in model calibration are available from the authors upon request. 15 Our analysis is coherent with Lucas' critique because the parameters used to calibrate the model are structural parameters. As suggested by Lucas (1976) , in order to predict the impact of a policy simulation, one should model parameters related to preferences, technology, and resource constraints that drive individual behavior and that are invariant to policy changes.
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Both spouses reduce leisure time but allocate more time to domestic activities, even though the increase is not remarkable (0.16% for the husband and 1.49% for the wife as shown in panel A of table 3).
16 Interestingly, the increase in non-labor income does not affect either the off-farm or on-farm work of professional family members. Another relevant difference across farm households is that spouses on the non-professional farm reduce offfarm working hours by about 20% with respect to the base value.
Panel B of table 3 describes the impact of the increase in non-labor income on the intra-household distribution of both monetary resources u i , comprising non-labor income and farm profits, and individual full income I i , The Collective Farm-household Model: Policy and Welfare Simulations comprising monetary u i and non-monetary resources, such as the value of time. In professional farm households, the distribution of both monetary and non-monetary resources slightly increases in equal proportions for both the husband and the wife. This is due to the fact that non-labor income is a negligible source of the family's income. As a result, the division slightly favors the husband (0.52) versus the wife (0.48) maintaining the status quo described in the benchmark case of table 2. On the other hand, non-labor income is a vital source of the household monetary resources of nonprofessional farms. The 10% increase in non-labor income increases the availability of monetary resources by about 15%. Because the increase in monetary resources is equally shared, the proportions remain unchanged, clearly favoring the husband, who maintains greater control (0.55 versus 0.45) over monetary resources. The husband's contribution in the full income formation of non-professional farms falls to 0.52, showing the importance of non-monetary resources for achieving a more equal distribution across genders. The increase in the wife's market wage produces comparable results across farm households. In line with Proposition 2, the raise in the wife's market wage has no effects on the on-farm labor supply of both spouses, while it reduces the wife's domestic working hours and increases the husband's domestic work, confirming the gross substitutability between spouses in domestic tasks as shown in Proposition 3 (panel A of table 4). As a result of the increase in the wife's market wage, the wife reduces time spent in leisure activities and allocates more hours to the off-farm labor market. These results are more sizable for non-professional than professional spouses. A decreasing leisure demand and an increasing off-farm labor supply due to an own-wage effect are in line with expectations, though not uniquely defined in Proposition 2. The increase in the wife's market wage also affects the husband labor supply indirectly through the sharing rule. This feature is unique to collective models that describe labor choices as the outcome of the bargaining process between the husband and the wife. Similar to their wives' choices, husbands decide to enjoy less leisure time and to increase off-farm working hours as the effect of an increase in the wife's market wage.
Because an increase in the wage rate does not affect on-farm labor decisions, both the size and the distribution of monetary resources remain unchanged. As is reasonable to expect, the rise in the wife's market wage tends to redistribute non-monetary household resources towards the wife. For instance, the wife's full income share increases by more than 2% in professional farms and by about 3.8% in non-professional farms against a comparable reduction in the husband's share (panel B of table 4). Compared with the benchmark case described in table 2, the sharing of non-monetary resources has a moderate equalizing effect in the professional farm household, and a marked effect in the non-professional households where the time resources can be adjusted with relatively more degrees of freedom. Note that it would not be possible to simulate this result using a standard unitary household model.
Because we model on-farm labor as a quasi-fixed factor whose wage is endogenously determined and is independent of market wages, marketable production decisions are not affected by the positive change in the wife's market wage (panel D of table 4). Unlike this, as shown in the bottom line of table 4, the price of the non-marketable good increases by about 6% for both Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 
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Note: Percentage variations are computed with respect to the base value. Blanks (-) indicate no change relative to the base value. Units are reported in table 2.
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy farm households as a result of the increase in the opportunity cost of the wife's domestic work. An increase in crop price affects both the production and the consumption side of the household economy. As expected, the price rise results in an increase in the agricultural shadow wage and in higher profits for the professional farm-households, and in a fall in losses for the non-professional farmhouseholds (panel D of table 5). As shown in Proposition 4, due to an increase in the crop price, non-professional husbands allocate more hours to farm activities while deciding to quit off-farm labor supply (panel A of table 5). Given the ability to substitute production between spouses, non-professional wives respond by cutting on-farm labor supply. Professional husbands do not participate in the off-farm labor market and, therefore, do not vary their onfarm labor supply; their wives' on-farm labor supply does not change. In terms of wives' domestic work and off-farm supply, the simulation evidence is remarkably different across farm-households. Professional wives do not participate in the off-farm labor market; they reduce their leisure time and increase their domestic working hours. Non-professional wives allocate the time saved from the agricultural activity to work longer hours in off-farm employment. Changes pertaining to leisure time and domestic work are of negligible magnitude. The wives of both farm-types suffer an important income loss that weakens their power position within the family (-1.54% for professional and -1.45% for non-professional). While the share of monetary resources remains unchanged as for the other households, the wife's control over non-monetary resources falls slightly (panel B of table 5).
As is reasonable to expect, the impact of an increase in the crop price has a positive impact on crop production larger than the 10% change in both farm-household types (panel D of table 5). This increase is associated with a decrease in livestock and milk production in the professional farm household due to the structure of the substitution effects. An increase in the crop price also increases chemicals and materials, while it has a negligible impact on hired labor for non-professional farm households because the crop technology is not labor-using. The price of the non-marketable good increases for both farm households. The effect is much more marked for professional than for non-professional farm households (bottom of panel D of table 5).
We now show a comparative statics exercise implemented for both the collective and unitary models. 17 The analysis uses the theoretical findings, presented in the Comparative Statics section, for the collective model and those of appendix B for the unitary approach. For illustrative purposes, we focus only on the leisure choices. 18 The analysis assumes that individual leisure prices are equal to individual specific market wages and is confined to interior solutions. Table 6 shows the variations of individual leisure demands due to simulated changes in family non-labor income, output price, and the wife's market wage for the husband and wife of both professional and nonprofessional farms. A ceteris paribus increase in non-labor income (columns (1) and (2) of table 6) has a positive income effect on individual leisure demands in both models. The increase is smaller in the collective model 17 The analysis is carried out using the mean values of individual leisure prices (table 2) and simulated changes in the sharing rule (tables 3 to 5). 18 We do not implement the analysis for on-farm and domestic labor supplies because production is not affected by intra-household consumption decisions due to separability. because the non-labor income increase is shared between spouses and not pooled at the household level. Each spouse receives only a share of the supplemental amount of non-labor income. Similar considerations apply to changes in output price. The increased amount of profits is shared between spouses in the collective model, while it is pooled in the unitary one. As a result, the increased demand of leisure is lower in the collective model because each spouse has a command over only a proportion of total household income. Interestingly, an increase in the wife's market wage has a large own effect and a more rigid cross effect, especially in the collective model where the wage increases also affect the decision-making process. An increase in the wife's market wage has a positive income effect that is smaller than the negative price effect on her own leisure demand. Because the wife does not share her labor income with the husband, the positive income effect is larger and the change of her leisure consumption is lower in the collective framework. In the unitary model the increase in the wife's market wage raises family total income and has a positive income effect on the husband's leisure demand. Given that labor income is assigned to each individual, in the collective model the increase in the wife's market wage implies a redistribution of non-labor income and profits in favor of the wife and at the expense of the husband, who does not benefit from the increase in his wife's labor income. As a consequence, the husband's demand for leisure is not affected by the decrease in individual income.
For all shocks described in table 6, the change in hours of leisure per month is lower in the collective representation. Only the behavioral response associated with a change in the wife's wage is economically significant when compared with the baseline level of monthly hours of leisure reported in table 2. Interestingly, in the collective model, the change in the wife's wage does not affect the demand for leisure of the males of both professional and non-professional farm-household types. In the unitary model the cross-wage effect has a direct but small impact on leisure. In the collective case, we only have an indirect effect through the sharing rule. On the other hand, the own effect on leisure time due to a change in the wife's wage is important. This significantly different responsiveness across models should be relevant for the design of effective gender-specific labor policies.
As shown by the simulation results conducted at the individual level and presented in table 7, a non-labor income change or a variation in market wages or in output prices may result in a change of individual leisure prices, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy shadow wages, and the endogenous price of the non-marketable good. In addition, individual full incomes also vary. The change in individual full incomes occurs both through a change in the value of the time endowment and in the share of household resources. Note that a change in i's market wage also affects j's utility through two channels: the change in the price of the domestic good and in the sharing rule. Table 7 shows that the CV i necessary to maintain individual utility constant in response to a 10% increase in non-labor income is positive for spouses of professional farms and negligible for spouses of non-professional farms. The utility money-metric suggests that spouses of professional farms are worse off because the non-labor income rise increases both individual leisure prices and the price of the non-marketable good. Spouses then need monetary compensation for the price increases to preserve their initial utility. However, the non-labor income increase does not affect endogenous prices for non-professional households. The monthly CV i necessary to maintain the wife's utility constant in response to a 10% increase in her market wage amounts to 539 Euros and 233 Euros for professionals and non-professionals, respectively. As a percentage, the CV i for wives of professional farms amounts to roughly 13% of their full income, whereas this percentage is about 9% for non-professional wives. The difference is related to the smaller impact of the wife's market wage increase on the endogenous price of the non-marketable good observed for non-professional households. The CV i for husbands is the same across farm types. Husbands need monetary compensation to preserve their initial utility, otherwise it would decrease, partly because of the rise of the endogenous price of the domestically-produced good and partly because of the reduction in their share of household resources.
An increase in the crop price gives a monthly CV i of 1,039 Euros for husbands and 239 Euros for wives of professional enterprises. For instance, the compensating variation related to a change in the output price leads to a household welfare loss of 1,278 euros, of which 19% involve the well-being of the wife (e239/e1,278) and 81% of the husband (e1,039/e1,278). The reduction in the utility level is much more restrained for males of nonprofessional farms than for professional members experiencing a smaller increase in their leisure price and in the price of the non-marketable good compared to professional members. The CV i for wives of non-professional farms is negative, meaning that they are better-off.
Conclusions
This study extends several aspects of the farm-household model. We analyze production and consumption-leisure decisions separately for the husband and wife within the collective framework. We also represent the farm household as involved in the production of marketable and non-marketable goods, such as housework, caring for household members, or food preparation that are traditionally overlooked in the farm-household literature, but crucial for explaining female labor choices. We then employ the farmhousehold collective approach to perform a simulation analysis using a programming model. We simulate the impact of hypothetical policy or market changes on production supply, consumption-leisure demand, intra-household resource allocation, and individual welfare.
An innovative element of our programming model is that it is the exact replica of the underlying collective empirical model estimated in Menon and Perali (2013) . The functional forms and the associated parameters of the programming model are the same as the econometric model, allowing us to obtain results closer to reality. To implement the household enterprise model we define the new concept of a collective (social) accounting matrix at the household level, whose social dimensions are intra-household classes. An interesting extension of our programming approach, here limited to the comparison of the behavioral responses of two household types and their members, can be obtained from building an accounting matrix and its associated equilibrium model for each household in the sample. In so doing, it would be possible to conduct inferential analyses.
Unlike the unitary model, the collective representation of household behavior analyses individual behavioral responses and allows the recovery of the welfare function of each household member. The present application distinguishes between the husband and the wife, but one could extend Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy this study to also include children if one is interested in studying intrahousehold transfers across genders and generations (Arias et al. 2003; Menon and Perali 2012; Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur 2013) . The results show marked differences in marketable and non-marketable production choices and individual consumption of goods and time. These differences not only affect the impact on individual well-being, but also have important policy implications that can be differentiated by gender.
As an example, if we compare the level of individual and household wellbeing of professional and non-professional farm households, then nonprofessional farmers not only have a very feeble agricultural identity, and as such they hardly represent an elected target group of rural development policies, but their low level of well-being also places them at the margin of society as a whole. The non-professional farmers in our sample are households in the middle stage of their life-cycle mainly located in the south of Italy that should be a high-priority target for both welfare and labor policies independent of rural development policies. Our results show that policies aimed at increasing non-farming job opportunities for women in the south would favorably impact households' welfare and would reduce the wellbeing gap within the couple by achieving a more equalizing effect on the household distribution of resources. The collective approach thus provides policy makers with the relevant information to design and target policies appropriate both for the household and the individual.
One goal of our analysis is to show that the collective representation of household enterprises allows for welfare evaluations at the individual rather than the household level. The results of the simulation analysis are in line with the qualitative predictions shown in the theory section. In general, the impact of a policy change is distributed between husband and wife in highly different proportions depending on the household types and policy scenarios. The collective approach is also a powerful means of understanding gender-specific labor choices as outcomes of both a bargaining process within the household and the constraints associated with the household production technologies. Our model, for example, predicts how the labor supply of the husband and wife respond to market variations. The simulation shows that labor supply responses often vary remarkably by gender. Benefits from specialization and the efficient allocation of tasks (Pollak 2012) are captured especially by the wife who can use her time endowment to undertake unpaid but valuable activities in household production. The simulated gender division of paid and unpaid labor is both an effective risk-sharing strategy and a powerful device to reduce the intra-household gender gap. Ad hoc simulations may help to improve our understanding about the specialization and gender-specific risk-copying strategy that a miniature household economy has the option to implement with success.
: In order to highlight that a change in the level of on-farm profit, p ¼ p p q ; r; w Ã on ; H; d q À Á , affects individual income shares, we specify the sharing rule as u 1 ¼ u p 1 ; p 2 ; w 1 ; w 2 ; y þp; d 1 ; d 2 ð Þ and u 2 ¼ y þp ð ÞÀu 1 . Recall also that the husband is indexed as i ¼ 1 and the wife as i ¼ 2.
We start by considering a positive change in household non-labor income y. If leisure is a normal good 
and decreases off-farm labor
The latter result is because the income transfer does not affect either individual on-farm working hours or domestic labor supply 19 The comparative statics analysis is made considering a fixed level of domestic output z. A non-labor income increase may have indirect effects on domestic production. The rise in exogenous income may increase individuals' demand for the domestic-produced good, and, as a consequence, both spouses invest additional time in non-marketable production. The increased demand for spouses' time-input in domestic chores is driven by domestic production technology and the separability property is preserved (Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss 2014) .
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Proof of Proposition 2
If leisure is an ordinary good ol i ow i < 0, leisure and the domestic good are gross substitutes ol i op Ã z > 0, and the sharing rule is increasing in i's market wage
,where P z ðw 1 ; w 2 ; d z Þ is a unit cost function with oP z ow i > 0. 20 According to the magnitude of price and income effects, the overall effect of a change in w i on individual i's demand for leisure may be positive or negative. On the production side, the market wage increase has no effects on household labor supplies, while it reduces domestic working hours
An increase in the market wage ambiguosly affects i's off-farm labor supply
Proof of Proposition 3
We now analyze the cross-wage effect. If an increase in j's market wage leads to a reduction in i's income share, ou i ow j < 0, then i's leisure demand varies ambiguously with j's wage rate
For production choices, we assume that family members are substitutes in domestic production and therefore
Following an increase in the off-farm wage, on-farm optimal working hours do not change
20 The endogenous price P z ðw 1 ; w 2 ; d z Þ is an increasing function of individual wages, In terms of off-farm labor supply, the comparative static result is ambiguous. From the time constraint we have
Proof of Proposition 4
We now analyze the effect of an increase in the output price p q . Assuming that member i benefits from the increase in profits due to the rise in the output price,
Changes in the output price have no effects on domestic labor supply
The impact of an increase in the output price on the husband's on-farm working hours is positive,
because we expect ow op q to be positive and individual 1's on-farm labor supply to be increasing in the shadow wage oh 1 ow Ã on > 0. Given the substitutability between spouses' on-farm work, it follows that
In terms of market hours, from the time constraint we derive
and
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Consumption-leisure Choices within the Unitary Model
Under separability, production decisions derived within different approaches do not differ, therefore household production choices, both marketable and non-marketable, are those derived in the first section. Unlike production, the consumption-leisure choices in general are model-specific.
In the context of a unitary approach, the household consumption behavior is represented by the maximization of a household welfare function
where p is the profit function, and
The conditions satisfied by these demand functions are the usual restrictions on the Slutsky matrix (symmetry and negative semi-definiteness) and income pooling, both of which in general have been rejected by empirical analyses (Browning and Chiappori 1998; Fortin and Lacroix 1997; Phipps and Burton 1998; Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990 ). The income pooling condition says that the distribution of household income y 1 þ y 2 ¼ y across family members plays no role in determining individual optimal choices, only the total level of y does. Formally, this condition is 
Non-labor Income Effect
Under the common assumption of normality, individual leisure demand increases when household non-labor income increases ol i oy > 0. Because of separability between production and consumption choices, a change in nonlabor income does not affect household production choices. Therefore, the non-labor income effect related to the individual off-farm labor supplyL
It is worth noting that in unitary models income changes have direct effects on demand equations, while in collective models they are also conveyed through the sharing rule function and affect the other member's choices.
Own-wage Effect
Exogenous own-wage changes yield variations in individual leisure demands that can be decomposed as
where the direction of 23 In the unitary framework, the demand for the consumption and domestic good is observed as a household aggregate. One of the objectives of the collective approach is to identify individual demands in general.
The Collective Farm-household Model: Policy and Welfare Simulations the effect, without extra assumptions, is undefined: if the positive effect
, then individual i reduces the time allocated to leisure activities, probably in favor of paid work if the market wage is higher than the shadow wages of leisure, farm, and home production. Reproducing the same analysis on individual labor supplies, one obtains
, where the change in the domestic activities reinforces the own-wage leisure effect, thus increasing the likelihood that individual i increases her paid work time. Given the structure of demand equations underlying unitary models, variations in own-wage do not capture variations in the bargaining power between spouses that is reasonably present in families. The comparative statics for domestic work and on-farm work are referred to those of the Comparative Statics section.
Cross-wage Effect
The cross-wage effects on leisure demands are
. These differ with respect to those derived in the collective model because the cross-wage effect operates directly ol i ow j on the demand equation. The sign of this effect depends on the substitution-complementarity relationship between leisure demands of the two household members. Similarly, for labor supply we have Own-wage
Cross-wage
Collective model Income
Own-wage
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Output-price Effect
The increase in the output price p q affects individual leisure demand as follows:
. Changes in the output price have no effects on domestic labor supply and the impact on on-farm working hours is positive as described in the Comparative Statics section. In terms of market hours, from the time constraint, we derive
Appendix C Collective Household Accounting Matrix
By convention, in an accounting matrix row entries refer to output, receipts, and incomes, whereas column entries represent inputs, outlays, and expenditures. Values are expressed in Euros per month. The agricultural production is aggregated in four outputs-crops, livestock, milk and fruit, and olives and grapes-that are sold on competitive markets at exogenous prices. The aggregate value of the agricultural production is e8,559 for the professionals and e1,431 for the non-professionals (row 3 in tables C1 and C2). These figures also include the monetary value of agricultural transfers that farms received by the government in the form of decoupled payments. 24 The production factors are partly bought on the market (market inputs) and partly owned by the household (family labor) and are remunerated from the value added (rows 1 and 2 in tables C1 and C2). The aggregate cost of market inputs amounts to e3,973 for the professional farm-household type and e688 for the non-professional farm-household type (column 1 in tables C1 and C2). On-farm family labor costs e1,463 to professional farms and e1,044 to non-professional households (column 2 in tables C1 and C2). The structure of the ISMEA data allows us to separately evaluate the cost of the husband's and wife's on-farm work. The husband on professional (non-professional) farms costs e1,002 (e658) to the household enterprise, whereas the wife costs e462 (e386). Profits accrued from the agricultural activity amount to e3,122 for professional farms, whereas the loss undergone by non-professional farms amounts to e301 (column 3 in tables C1 and C2).
Individual full-incomes (rows 4 and 5 in tables C1 and C2) are obtained summing the value of individual total time endowment (the sum of on-farm work, domestic work, off-farm work, and leisure) and individual share of household non-labor income and profits or losses from the agricultural business (Castagnini, Menon, and Perali 2003) . Profits and household non-labor income (e597 for professional farms and e929 for non-professional farms) are shared between spouses according to the sharing rule estimated from the same ISMEA data by Menon and Perali (2013) . The estimation results show that, on average, the husband belonging to professional (non-professional) farms attracts 52.3% (55.4%) of the total amount of household resources shared by spouses, compared to 47.7% (44.6%) obtained by the wife (column 6 in tables C1 and C2).
Household members spend their full income purchasing market goodsfood, clothing, and an aggregated market good-the domestic produced Here we report disaggregated values for market inputs, agricultural production, and individual consumption of market goods. Market inputs: The Collective Farm-household Model: Policy and Welfare Simulations good, and leisure (columns 4 and 5 in tables C1 and C2). The representative man of professional (non-professional) enterprises spends e484 (e499) to consume the domestic good, e967 (e1,119) to enjoy leisure, and e2,947 (e1,231) to buy market goods. The representative woman of professional (non-professional) farms spends e746 (e672) to consume the domestic good, e1,111 (e1,173) to enjoy leisure and e2,236 (e832) to buy market goods. The rest of the economy-row 11 in tables C1 and C2-gains by supplying market inputs (e3,973 for the professional farm type and e688 for the nonprofessional farm type) and selling market goods (e5,183 for professional farms and e2,064 for non-professional farms). The rest of the economycolumn 11 in tables C1 and C2-acquires the assets produced by the households (e8,559 for professional farms and e1,431 for non-professional farms), pays non-labor income (e597 to professional farms and e929 to nonprofessional farms) and off-farm work (e0 to professionals and e392 to nonprofessionals). Professional and non-professional farms differ substantially in terms of labor market participation. Family members of professional enterprises do not supply off-farm work.
Appendix D Specification and Equilibrium Conditions of the Programming Model
The functional form specification and equilibrium conditions adopted in the programming model are described below and summarized in table D1. The conditions reproduce the empirical specification of the econometric model estimated by Menon and Perali (2013) , whose parameters are used to calibrate the programming model. We define the set of market inputs f ¼ fchemicals, materials, hired laborg, the quasi-fixed factor H ¼ family labor and the set of outputs s ¼ fcrop, livestock, milk, fruits, olives and grapesg. The set of consumption goods is denoted as k ¼ fleisure, domestic good, food, clothing, other market goodsg which is disaggregated in the subset of market goods as b ¼ ffood, clothing, other market goodsg. Member 1 is the husband and member 2 is the wife.
Household Production Decisions
The equations describing marketable production activities of the household enterprises are the total cost function, input factor demands, the shadow wage, revenue shares, and profit equation.
Total cost function Menon and Perali (2013) estimate the farm production technology from the dual side to account both for the non-homogeneity of family and hired labor (D'Antoni, Mishra, and Gillespie 2011) and the fact that hired labor is a variable factor with an associated observable market wage, while family labor is a quasi-fixed factor with an associated shadow wage (Paris 1989) . The total restricted cost function for the agricultural production takes a Translog form with four outputs, three market inputs and the quasi-fixed factor
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